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ABSTRACT
The consumption of multi-ingredient foods is increasing across the globe. Traceability can be
used as a tool to gather information about and manage food safety risks associated with these
types of products. The authors investigate the choice of voluntary traceability in three-tiered
multi-ingredient food supply chains. They propose a framework based on vertical control and
agency theory to model three dimensions of traceability systems: depth, breadth, and
precision. Their analysis has three main results. First, full traceability is feasible as long as
there are net beneﬁts to a downstream ﬁrm that demands traceability across all ingredients.
Second, horizontal network externalities are positive because an increase in the level of
traceability in one ingredient requires a similar increase in others. Finally, vertical network
effects will be positive insofar as willingness to pay and probabilities of food safety hazards
increase. [EconLit Classiﬁcation: Q130, L140]. r 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

1. INTRODUCTION
Consumers around the world are increasingly buying and consuming food products
that require minimum time spent on preparation before being consumed. These
products frequently contain multiple ingredients where different agricultural
commodities or processed inputs are combined into a ﬁnal foodstuff sold directly
to consumers. Producing, processing, and supplying these products presents new and
challenging problems. Cross-contamination may increase due to bottlenecks and a
higher chance of opportunistic behavior by agents supplying the ﬁnal processor.
There may be a need for identity preservation of inputs. Finally, externalities may
emerge between supply chains that in the recent past were considered independent.
Traceability systems may be used to improve the management of information
within and between ﬁrms, to respond to consumer demand, and to reduce the risk of
food safety hazards in supply chains for multi-ingredient products. Typically, the
production of multi-ingredient products involves a recipe and ﬁnal quality critically
depends on the quality of the components. Examples of multi-ingredient products
abound, ranging from packed mixed salads to frozen pizzas. Implementing
traceability in supply chains for these products is a complex coordination problem
that may require new institutional arrangements.
Our goal here is to analyze the economic implications of a voluntary traceability
system in a supply chain producing multi-ingredient foods. It analyzes interﬁrm

traceability in multi-ingredient food production as a coordination problem,
investigating the conditions under which none, a limited number, or all ﬁrms
provide traceability. It models traceability as a ﬂow of information that has
dimensions of depth, breadth, and precision. More speciﬁcally, the objective is to
determine the optimal level of traceability in multi-ingredient food chains and how
this level is inﬂuenced by network effects.
In 2002, through regulation (EC) 178/2002, the European Parliament and the
Council (2002) laid down the general principles and requirements of food law,
created the European Food Safety Authority, and imposed procedures in matters of
food safety. One of the measures aimed at assuring safer food is mandatory
traceability, which became effective in January 2005. This regulation deﬁnes
traceability as the ‘‘ability to trace and follow a food, feed, food-producing animal or
substance intended to be, or expected to be incorporated into a food or feed through
all stages of production, processing, and distribution’’ (p. 8). From this deﬁnition, it
can be inferred that traceability implies a ﬂow of information between ﬁrms, involves
interﬁrm coordination, and covers both single and multi-ingredient foods.
Meuwissen, Velthuis, Hogeveen, and Huirne (2003) place the ﬁrm and supply
chain within a broader European framework to improve food safety that has three
levels. At the broadest level are the European Commission’s food safety and hygiene
rules. Then each member state has its own speciﬁc country-level standards. Finally,
at a more speciﬁc level, there are private standards for certiﬁcation. Folbert and
Dagevos (2000) suggest that European Union (EU) consumers and legislators are
concerned not only with the safety of foods, but also with how food is obtained.
Thus, safety is not the sole motivator for traceability adoption. It may also correct
market failures, reduce costs of identiﬁcation of origins of products, and reduce
transaction costs (Hobbs, 2004; Hobbs, Bailey, Dickinson, & Haghiri, 2005). This
may explain why traceability is being so widely adopted in Europe and why retailers
in the EU are pushing for more stringent systems than required by legislation.
Information is a valuable asset for ﬁrms (Sporleder & Moss, 2002). It facilitates
trade and can lead to considerable efﬁciencies throughout the supply chain.
Consumers and ﬁrms may be willing to pay a premium for information.
A traceability system is a tool through which information ﬂowing among parties
in a supply chain can be more effectively and efﬁciently managed. It can also
improve logistics operations and minimize the impact of food safety hazards (Hobbs,
2004; Meuwissen et al., 2003). However, traceability is costly, as it requires
gathering, storing, and sharing information. In addition, its beneﬁts may not be
evenly distributed across the supply chain, which may lead to the adoption of
suboptimal traceability. It is therefore of critical importance to analyze the
coordination, structural, and institutional implications of traceability adoption.
2. OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ECONOMIC APPROACHES
TO TRACEABILITY ANALYSIS
There is already a sizable literature on the economics of traceability systems. Moe
(1998) distinguishes two types of traceability: chain traceability tracks a batch and its
history through production, transport, storage, processing, distribution, and sales.
Internal traceability documents all production processes within a ﬁrm. Although the
economic studies on traceability generally focus on the ﬁrst type, operations research

and management science studies have focused on implementation of internal
traceability.
In operations research and management science, traceability is seen as an
information system devised to coordinate information between different divisions
within a ﬁrm. For example, Dupuy, Botta-Genoulaz, and Guinet (2005) use an
operations research approach to improve a traceability system. They formulate an
optimization problem that minimizes the size of recalled production batches.
Similarly, Jansen-Veullers, van Dorp, and Beulens (2003) present a solution for an
information management system within a ﬁrm to support traceability. Their system
integrates process, control, information, and information infrastructure layers.
Hofstede (2002) discusses transparency in netchains, deﬁned as a new interdisciplinary ﬁeld of research derived from technology and information systems on
the one hand and social sciences on the other. The concept combines network and
supply chain management approaches, mixed with economics and other social
sciences. Hofstede argues that the formation of netchains is associated with the need
to exchange goods and money, but he also points out how critical information is and
argues it constitutes the life force of netchains.
Trienekens and Beulens (2001) suggest that only part of the information generated
by a supplier about its products and processes is passed down to the buyer. The
information ﬂow is decoupled from the product ﬂow, which implies that only an
aggregate level of information moves with the product along the supply chain. The
challenge is then to devise a way to maintain the relation between the aggregate
information transferred and the detailed information retained by the supplier.
The importance of the operations research literature is that it clearly relates
traceability to information systems. This perspective envisions the construction of a
traceability system as an optimization problem aiming to govern the ﬂow of
information between different departments of a ﬁrm. When considering the case for
traceability implementation along a food chain, it may be more appropriate to
approach it as a network problem. The analysis of traceability in this article builds
on the operations research insights, but takes an economics approach.
The economics perspective on traceability has two fundamental streams: the
demand and supply sides. From the demand side the main problem is to determine
consumer’s willingness to pay for traceability. Dickinson and Bailey (2002) ﬁnd that
American consumers are willing to pay a premium for traceability in beef and pork
sandwiches. Hobbs et al. (2005) obtain similar results when using experimental
auctions in the United States and Canada to determine consumer willingness to pay
for traceability in beef and pork. Banterle and Stranieri (2008) ﬁnd that a majority of
consumers they surveyed in Italy said that having a mandatory traceability code on
fresh meat is important. Moreover, they ﬁnd that 84% of the respondents mentioned
that beef labelling should mention the country of origin of the animal. As yet, there
are no similar surveys on the willingness to pay for and interest in traceability in
multi-ingredient foods.
In this article, we analyze the economics of the supply of traceability systems for
multi-ingredient foods. The economic impacts of traceability adoption in food chains
have only recently started to be played out. Hobbs (2004) focuses on the role of
traceability in the food system and distinguishes ‘‘ex post reactive systems that allow
the traceback of affected products in the event of a contamination problem so as to
minimize social costs, ex post systems that facilitate the allocation of liability, and

information systems that provide ex ante quality veriﬁcation’’ (p. 397). Traceability
has three main functions: (a) reduce costs associated with risks of food safety
occurrences, (b) strengthen liability incentives, and (c) allow for ex ante veriﬁcation
of credence quality attributes.
Meuwissen et al. (2003) identify three key questions: What is the breakeven point
for levels of traceability? What are the impacts of traceability on current liability and
recall insurance schemes? How can regulatory incentives avoid free-riding? They
offer an overview of potential costs and beneﬁts of traceability and certiﬁcation in
meat supply chains. Traceability costs are associated with system implementation
(e.g., changes in procedures, decreased ﬂexibility, and increased levels of automation,
inventory, personnel, and documentation) and maintenance (through auditing). The
beneﬁts include increased transparency, reduced risk of liability claims,1 more
effective recalls, enhanced logistics, improved control of livestock epidemics, possible
positive effects on trade, easier product licensing, and possible price premiums.
According to Golan et al. (2004), in Europe traceability has mainly been motivated
by regulations; in the United States it tends to be solely motivated by market
conditions. They survey several different systems of traceability in agri-food
industries and characterize them using three dimensions: depth (how far up and
downstream the system goes), breadth (how many attributes are traced), and
precision (e.g., to what extent the origin is correctly identiﬁed). Golan et al. (2004)
ﬁnd that there is no single best way to introduce traceability and there is a large
variability in the characteristics of systems within and across industries, depending
on speciﬁc attributes of products or motivations to introduce traceability. They also
suggest that it is impossible to have full traceability in food, regardless of mandatory
or voluntary systems, and that choices have to be made on which attributes will be
traceable.
Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004) use a principal-agent model approach to
analyze the implications of introducing traceability in a food supply chain where
there is an inspection protocol. The producer is the agent and knows how safe the
product is; the processor (the principal) does not know the quality and safety of the
product. The processor wants to offer a price that maximizes his proﬁt while forcing
the producer to deliver information and a safe product.
Additional recent research has focused on different aspects of relationships
between traceability, inspection, and incentives, including liability, in producing
quality for single-ingredient products. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2007) propose a
principal-agent model where traceability is an exogenous variable that inﬂuences the
nature of contractual relations between agents in the supply chain. Traceability may
or not be demanded in the contract depending on inspection failure costs and the
possibility of identifying unsafe producers. Pouliot and Summer (2008) model the
supply of safe food in a two-stage marketing channel, where homogeneous farms sell
output to homogenous marketers who, in turn, sell to consumers. When traceability
is not available, ﬁrms are anonymous and may free-ride on producers of safer food.
Unsafe food can originate either at the farm or marketer levels and food-safety
incidents increase in the number of ﬁrms in the supply chain and with imperfect
traceability systems. Finally, Resende-Filho and Buhr (2008) propose a principal1
Meuwissen et al. (2003) write in the context of the EU where there is a limited liability rule. In the
United States where a strict liability rule prevails this may not necessarily be the case.

agent model where the choice of investment in traceability depends on the beneﬁts
from linking cattle feeder practices with the quality of retail beef cuts. They ﬁnd that
the larger investment costs are the higher is the rate of traceback success. However,
the lowest traceback success rate studied is the optimal choice for packers. These
results indicate important factors to be considered in analyzing the performance of
traceability systems for single-ingredient products.
Implementing traceability in multi-ingredient food chains involves the coordination of several different ﬁrms. Traceability is an information management tool and
its effectiveness and efﬁciency may be affected by information asymmetries and
imperfections. As in Starbird and Amanor-Boadu (2004), we use a principal-agent
model, but in our case we analyze traceability as an endogenous variable.
To model traceability in multi-ingredient food chains we combine a model of
vertical control proposed by Royer (1998) with agency theory. Royer’s model
provides a way to relate and transfer information between ﬁrms, whereas agency
theory provides a governance structure to manage the ﬂow of information. Our
analysis assumes that the costs of traceability to a ﬁrm, namely those of designing,
implementing, and operating an internal information system, are given. It departs
from previous analysis on the economics of traceability by proposing a three-tiered
supply chain model to analyze the choice of traceability in multi-ingredient products
and by modeling traceability as a level of information rather than a zero-one choice.
We analyze the conditions for no, partial, or full traceability and investigate the
impact of network effects on optimal traceability levels.
3. A MODEL OF VOLUNTARY TRACEABILITY IN A MULTI-INGREDIENT
SUPPLY CHAIN
Food supply chains involve a large number of ﬁrms, taking different actions in
different tiers of the chain. Globalization has brought increasing complexity to food
networks. In today’s global chains, there are vertical and horizontal links between
different ﬁrms at any giving point in a supply chain. In this section, we propose to
model a traceability system in a three-tiered chain governed by contracts. The
network structure in our model corresponds to the type ‘‘B’’ traceability system
proposed in Meuwissen et al. (2003), where at each tier of the supply chain there
must be traceability from every upstream ﬁrm in the chain.
Figure 1 shows the structure of the supply chain that we model. The ﬁrm in the
third tier downstream is a producer of a multi-ingredient product, for example, a
pizza, and buys ingredients (e.g., cheese or tomato paste) from different intermediate
processors (e.g., cheese or tomato paste producers) in the second tier. To produce the
ingredients, ﬁrms in the second tier purchase inputs (e.g., milk or tomatoes) from
farmers in the ﬁrst tier. Each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second tiers is specialized,
producing a single output and related information. The second-tier ﬁrms depend on
inputs supplied by a single and specialized supplier in the ﬁrst tier. Hence, each ﬁrm
has only one link within the network structure. For instance if farm a11 produces
tomatoes, it will sell only to the tomato paste processor a21. Agents in the ﬁrst tier
can be thought of either as a single farm or as a producer’s organization, e.g., a
cooperative. Note that within the same tier of the supply chain there is heterogeneity in hazards and costs of traceability across ﬁrms producing different
ingredients (e.g., milk vs. tomatoes, cheese vs. tomato paste). There is also
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Figure 1

Network structure of a multi-ingredient food traceability system.

heterogeneity between ﬁrms in the same ingredient supply chain across tiers (e.g.,
milk vs. cheese, tomatoes vs. tomato paste). This heterogeneity will result in
differences in the level of traceability provided by ﬁrms.
3.1. Assumptions
In the context of this article traceability is voluntary, which implies that every ﬁrm in
the food chain has the option not to adopt traceability. Trinekens and Beulens (2001)
argue that information ﬂows in traceability systems must relate to product ﬂows,
they also claim that the ﬂows do not have to occur simultaneously and may even be
decoupled. In this article, we assume that the product and information are
decoupled. We also assume that information can be contracted independently.
Early articles on the economics of traceability model it as a discrete choice; a ﬁrm
either has it or not (Hobbs, 2004). Golan et al. (2004) deﬁne traceability as
multidimensional (depth, breadth, and precision), and many researchers (see, e.g.,
Starbird & Amanor-Boadu, 2007; Pouliot & Sumner, 2008) embrace this deﬁnition;
nevertheless, most models and empirical work to date treat traceability as onedimensional. For example, Pouliot and Sumner (2008) deﬁne the degree of
traceability as the probability of correctly identifying the source of a food product.
However, as the Golan et al. deﬁnition suggests, traceability systems can carry
information on multiple attributes (e.g., safety, organic production processes), at
different depths (e.g., two-tier vs. three-tier supply chains), and with different levels
of precision.
Here we deﬁne the level of traceability as the precision of information provided by
each ﬁrm in the supply chain; the higher the level of traceability the more accurate
will be information on a given food product. The level of precision can reﬂect, for
example, the size of the lot to which the information refers. Additionally our
framework includes a measure of depth (the number of traceable vertical links in the
chain) and breadth (the number of ingredients for which there will be traceability).

We assume that traceability can be decomposed into units of information. Each
unit increases the precision of information and has the same monetary value.
Although our deﬁnition of the traceability level is novel, Goldsmith and Bender
(2004) argue that there is a continuum for the value of identity preservation. This
implies that for some products (e.g., organic foods) having more identity
information is valuable; for others (e.g., commodities) it is not. The following
assumptions are used in developing the model.
Assumption 1: Firms maximize proﬁts and they can proﬁt from traceability. Firms
get compensation for additional units of traceability they provide; hence, proﬁts are
the difference between the revenues from traceability and its respective costs. When
ﬁrms accept a contract to provide traceability, they may get a premium per unit of
traceability exchanged downstream.
Assumption 2: To have traceability for a multi-ingredient food, the risk neutral
third-tier ﬁrm offers a contract to each ingredient producer in the second tier. Risk
neutrality is a standard assumption in principal-agent models and implies that the
principal does not require a rent for bearing the risk. In contrast, a risk-averse thirdtier ﬁrm would require more traceability to decrease the food safety losses; the
opposite would be expected if the third-tier ﬁrm is a risk-seeker.
The contract speciﬁes the levels of traceability each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second tiers
must provide and the respective compensation. Thus, there are two sets of contracts:
ﬁrst, the third-tier ﬁrm offers a contract to second-tier ﬁrms, which, in turn, propose
a contract to farmers in the ﬁrst tier. Each contract calls for a speciﬁc level of
traceability. Thus, there is heterogeneity across ingredients and tiers (e.g., the level of
information required for fresh tomatoes is different from that for milk, which, in
turn, is different from that required for tomato paste or cheese). However, we
assume homogeneity between ﬁrms in the same tier producing the same ingredient.
For example, the contract for fresh tomatoes is the same for every producer selling to
a tomato paste processor. First- and second-tier ﬁrms have a choice in taking a
contract requiring traceability because they have an outside option of selling their
output in a spot market.
Assumption 3: Traceability levels are additive and each unit of information has the
same value. Traceability is a vertical and downstream ﬂow of information.
Traceability levels are denoted as g. Subscripts identify the location of ﬁrms in the
supply chain: The ﬁrst subscript identiﬁes the tier where the ﬁrm is located; the
second identiﬁes a given ﬁrm. For example, g1i identiﬁes the level of traceability
chosen by the ith ﬁrm in the ﬁrst tier. To have traceability and create new
information, downstream ﬁrms must offer a contract to obtain traceability
upstream. Thus, assume a linearly increasing chain relationship between upstream
and downstream traceability levels, i.e., g3 ¼ g3 ðg21 ; . . . ; g2n Þ, g2i ¼ g2i ðg1i Þ,
g03 40; g003 ¼ 0, and g02i 40; g002i ¼ 0(I 5 1,y,n). Note that the third-tier level of
traceability is indirectly impacted by each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. Further assume that if no
information is gathered upstream, it is impossible for second- and third-tier ﬁrms to
have traceability, thus, g2i ð0Þ ¼ 0(I 5 1,y,n) and g3 ð0Þ ¼ 0.
Assumption 4: The ﬁrst- and second-tier ﬁrms receive a price premium p per unit
of traceability provided when they take a contract. The premium is only for the level
of traceability corresponding to the output sold by each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second
tiers, proﬁts from output sales are entirely captured in the ﬁxed proﬁts term. This is
consistent with the idea of Hobbs (2004) who suggests that traceability can bring a

‘‘goodwill premium plus a premium due to greater consumer conﬁdence’’ (p. 401).
Furthermore, several studies analyzing the demand for traceability conducted in the
United States, Canada, and Spain suggest that consumers are willing to pay a
premium or assign a positive value to traceability (Gracia & Zeballos, 2005; Hobbs
et al., 2005). Again, subscripts identify the tier and the ﬁrm receiving the premium.
For instance, p21 is the premium for the traceability level g21 provided by Firm 1 in
the second tier to the third tier. Note that the premiums paid to the ﬁrst- and secondtier ﬁrms are endogenous variables, but given Assumption 1 above, the premium p3
paid by consumers to the third-tier ﬁrm is exogenous.
Assumption 5: Traceability is costly, as each ﬁrm has to invest in an internal
information system to obtain and transfer information. Hobbs (2004) mentions ﬁve
different costs: the direct costs of the traceability system, the impact of due diligence
decisions on production costs, and three additional costs that are incurred only if a
safety problem occurs. The logistics and operations research literature suggests there
are internal costs when implementing an information system to support traceability
(Goldsmith & Bender, 2004; Jansen-Veullers et al., 2003; Velthuis, Mourits, &
Hogeveen, 2008; Vernede, Verdenius, & Broeze, 2003). Here costs of traceability are
denoted as c, subscripts are then used to identify the location of the ﬁrm in the food
chain. We assume the costs of traceability are increasing and convex with units of
information, i.e., c ¼ cðg); c0 40, and c00 40. Furthermore, to simplify the analysis
assume that information systems are compatible across ﬁrms. This implies that there
is no additional cost linked to compatibility and transfer costs are zero.
Assumption 6: Meuwissen et al. (2003) suggest that ‘‘traceability systems require a
credible and complete information (in the sense of what has been agreed on) system
along all participants in the supply chain’’ (p. 169). Here we assume that the cost of
providing traceability is common knowledge and the principal has full information
on the types of agents and their effort levels. Relaxing these assumptions would
complicate contract design and lead to information rents. We further assume that
when ﬁrms take a contract to provide traceability downstream that all traceable
information is true.
Assumption 7: Along with consumer demand, traceability may be motivated by
the need to mitigate exposure to losses linked to food safety hazards. Hobbs (2004)
states that ‘‘y a liability cost is imposed on ﬁrms that have not exhibited due
diligence in reducing the potential for a food hazard problem’’ (p. 402). Meuwissen
et al. (2003) commenting on the new EU food laws argue, ‘‘food safety is the primary
responsibility of food producers’’ (p. 167). Here we assume the third-tier ﬁrm may
incur a liability loss (L) in the event of a food safety hazard, which occurs with
probability c 2 ½0; 1. However, the loss can be mitigated if there is traceability.
Assume that losses decrease at an increasing rate with traceability levels from the
third-tier ﬁrm, i.e., L ¼ Lðg3 Þ; L0 o0; and L00 40; further assume that if the thirdtier ﬁrm does not adopt traceability, it faces the maximum possible loss.
3.2. Model
The model explores the general conditions for the voluntary adoption of no, partial,
or full traceability in a three-tiered multi-ingredient supply chain. The problem of
each ﬁrm in the supply chain is introduced starting with ﬁrms in the ﬁrst tier. In this
tier, each ﬁrm produces a different commodity, and thus has different information to

insert in the traceability system. However, they face a similar problem of deciding
whether to take a contract from the second-tier ﬁrm based on the revenues and costs
of traceability. The ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm producing the ith commodity has the following
objective function.
Max 1i ¼ p1i g1i  c1i ðg1i Þ
g1i

ð1Þ

The ﬁrst term denotes the total revenue from traceability; the second represents the
costs of traceability for the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm producing the ith ingredient. Of course, in
real transactions there are no contracts for just the provision of traceability. The
choice of traceability can be seen as part of a larger contract where all other clauses
of the contractual arrangement are held constant.
To supply traceable ingredients downstream, each second-tier ﬁrm must propose a
contract to obtain traced commodities from the corresponding ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. Note
that second-tier ﬁrms are simultaneously a principal and an agent. Again, each ﬁrm
in the second tier produces a different ingredient, which may have a different value
and require different traceability levels. Consider the case of the second-tier ﬁrm
producing the ith ingredient, which is produced from the ith commodity obtained
upstream. From Assumption 3 above, to provide a traceable ingredient to the thirdtier ﬁrm, a second-tier ﬁrm must have traceability from a ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm to which it
offers a contract. The ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm will only accept a contract if it gets at least its
reservation utility, here assumed to be zero. Thus, the ith ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm’s
participation constraint is given by
p1i g1i  c1i ðg1i Þ

ð2Þ

From this expression, the second-tier ﬁrm sets the premium per traceability level
assuring participation from the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. Note that in this model the ﬁrst-tier
ﬁrm takes a contract if the premium for traceability set by the second-tier ﬁrm
corresponds to the average costs of traceability. To assure the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm provides
the level of traceability (g1i ) set in the contract, the ith second-tier ﬁrm sets the
following payment scheme.
8
>
< c1i ðg1i Þ if g1i  g
1i
g1i
ð3Þ
p1i ¼
>
:

0
if g1i og1i
This payment scheme implies that the participation constraint binds, which is the
case given Assumption 6 on full and complete information. The upper term in the
curled bracket is derived from the participation constraint in Equation (2) and states
that the ith ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm will receive p1i for providing the contracted level of
traceability g1i . The second term corresponds to the incentive compatibility
constraint and can be seen as a punishment for breaking the contractual level of
traceability. Note that the second-tier ﬁrm has no incentive to pay more than the
average costs of traceability, whereas the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm will get no beneﬁt from
providing more than the contracted level of traceability. Thus, the payment scheme
in Equation (3) provides incentives for the provision of an efﬁcient level of
traceability.

The problem of the second-tier ﬁrm producing the ith ingredient is formulated as
Max 2i ¼p2i g2i  p1i g1i  c2i ðg2i Þ
g2i

s:t:: g2i ¼g2i ðg1i Þ
c1i ðg1i Þ
p1i 
g1i

ð4Þ

where p2i denotes the compensation paid by the third-tier ﬁrm for the level of
traceability g2i , and c2i are the costs of traceability incurred by the second-tier ﬁrm.
Second-tier ﬁrms are conditioned in two ways. The ﬁrst is through the chain
relationship and dependency constraint associated with traceability levels. This
constraint is similar to those used in vertical models to assure a ﬂow of goods across
vertically linked ﬁrms (Royer, 1998). The second is by the participation and incentive
compatibility constraints that are used to assure ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms provide the levels of
traceability agreed to in their respective contracts.
Given that the participation constraint binds under the payment scheme in
Equation (3), the problem of the second-tier ﬁrm can be reformulated substituting
the constraints into the objective function:
Max 2i ¼ p2i g2i ðg1i Þ  c1i ðg1i Þ  c2i ðg2i ðg1i ÞÞ
g1i

ð5Þ

Following Dickinson and Bailey (2002), assume that consumers are willing to pay
a premium (p3) for traceability. To assure this information to consumers, the
downstream ﬁrm must offer a contract for the provision of traceability to at least one
ingredient producer in the second tier. The traceability level offered by the third-tier
ﬁrm depends on a vector of traceability levels across inputs from the second tier.
Recall that though the number of traceable links denotes the depth of the system and
the number of ingredients traced its breadth, the level of traceability is associated
with the precision of information in the traceability system. From Assumption 7,
along with consumer willingness to pay, the third-tier ﬁrm demands traceability
upstream to mitigate liability losses associated with food safety hazards. The
different ingredients may have different probabilities of causing a hazard. For
instance, cheese may have a higher risk of contamination than ﬂour. Thus,
heterogeneity between ﬁrms in the tier comes from the fact they produce different
ingredients and it is unlikely that the costs of traceability are identical across
products. Each ﬁrm in the same tier is distinct and may be required to provide
different levels of traceability to the third-tier ﬁrm. This point is well documented in
Golan et al. (2004) who ﬁnd different traceability systems across food industries. In
this model, rather than operating in isolation each industry is linked downstream
through supplying the same buyer.
Suppose that the third-tier ﬁrm offers a contract to the second-tier ﬁrm producing
the ith ingredient. This ﬁrm will only take a contract if it gets its reservation utility,
again assumed to be zero, i.e.,
p2i g2i  p1i g1i 1c2i ðg2i Þ

ð6Þ

This expression says that unless the third-tier ﬁrm offers a contract for traceability
to the ith second-tier ﬁrm such that its revenue at least compensates for costs of
traceability incurred by the second-tier ﬁrm, a contract will not be accepted. From
Equation (6), it can be seen that compensation to second-tier ﬁrms per level of

traceability must equal at least the average costs. Additionally, to ensure that the
contractual level of traceability ðg2i Þ is provided by the second-tier ﬁrm producing the
ith ingredient, the third-tier ﬁrm sets the following payment scheme.
8
>
< p1i g1i 1c2i ðg2i Þ if g2i  g
2i
g2
ð7Þ
p2i ¼
>
:

0
if g2i og2i
As in the case of the contract offered by second-tier ﬁrms upstream, the ﬁrst condition
is the participation constraint derived from Equation (6); the second is the incentive
compatibility constraint ensuring the second-tier ﬁrm will offer the traceability level set
in the contract or have a zero premium. Again note that from Assumption 6, this
payment scheme assures an efﬁcient level of traceability because the third-tier ﬁrm does
not have to pay more than the average cost of traceability and the second-tier ﬁrm is not
paid above its costs for providing an additional level of traceability.
The problem of the third-tier ﬁrm is quite complex, as this ﬁrm must design a set of
contracts to obtain traceability from up to n different ﬁrms in the second tier. This
denotes the breadth of the system, which in this model is the number of ingredients.
Furthermore, given Assumption 3 on the chain relationship between traceability
levels, the third-tier ﬁrm is further constrained by the provision of traceability by
ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms to second-tier ﬁrms. Let g1 and g2 represent column vectors with n
elements each corresponding to traceability levels from each ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and
second tiers, respectively. The objective function of the third-tier ﬁrm is
Max E½3  ¼p3 g3 
g3

n
X

p2i g2i  c3 ðg3 Þ  cLðg3 Þ

i¼1

s:t:: g3 ¼g3 ðG2 Þ
g21 ¼g21 ðg11 Þ; . . . ; g2n ¼ g2n ðg1n Þ
G1 0
p11 g11 1c21 ðg21 Þ
p1n g1n 1c2n ðg2n Þ
; . . . ; p2n 
p21 
g11
g1n
c11 ðg11 Þ
c1n ðg1n Þ
p11 
; . . . ; p1n 
g11
g1n

ð8Þ

In this expression, p3 is the premium paid to the third-tier ﬁrm for providing
traceability, the remaining notation is as deﬁned above. These are expected total
proﬁts because the expression includes a probability of a food safety event. The
third-tier ﬁrm has to consider a larger number of constraints. The participation
constraints bind by the payment schemes in Equations (3) and (7) speciﬁed above.
Thus, we can sequentially substitute the constraints for the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm into the
corresponding second-tier ﬁrm’s problem and then into the third-tier ﬁrm’s problem,
yielding
"
#
Max 3 ¼p3 g3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; . . . ; g2n ðg1n ÞÞ 
G1

n
X

i¼1

c1i ðg1i Þ1

n
X

c2i ðg2i ðg1i ÞÞ

i¼1

 c3 ðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; . . . ; g2n ðg1n ÞÞÞ  cLðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; . . . ; g2n ðg1n ÞÞÞ
s:t:: G1  0

ð9Þ

This problem has n necessary conditions, leading to n optimal levels of traceability
for the commodities produced by ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms. Because of the functional
relationship between up- and downstream traceability levels and full information,
the third-tier ﬁrm sets the level of traceability for each ingredient upstream. This
deﬁnes the depth (through the tiers of the system), breadth (whether ingredients have
traceability), and precision (the optimal level of traceability) for the system. Given
space limitations, only the necessary condition for setting the level of traceability
provided by the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm producing the ith commodity that maximizes the ﬁrsttier ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts is shown.
@3
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
¼ 0 ) p3 3 g02i  cL0 ðÞg02i 3 ¼ c01i 1c02i g02i 1c03 ðÞg02i 3
@g1i
@g2i
@g2i
@g2i

ð10Þ

The left-hand side of the second equality shows the indirect marginal beneﬁts of
having traceability from the ith ﬁrm. There are two marginal beneﬁts: The ﬁrst is the
effect on an additional premium and the second is the reduction in expected marginal
loss due to food safety hazards. Although the expected marginal loss term has a
negative sign, recall that by Assumption 7 the value of the liability loss decreases
with traceability. The right-hand side shows the aggregate marginal costs of
traceability borne by each ﬁrm in each tier involved in the production of the ith
ingredient. The contracted levels of traceability for the corresponding second-tier
ﬁrms and the third-tier ﬁrm are derived using the constraints of the problem of the
third-tier ﬁrm and the levels of traceability for each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. Then, using the
participation constraints, the premiums offered in the contracts proposed to secondand ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms are also obtained. This problem has 2ðn1nÞ11 endogenous
variables and two exogenous variables (the premium for traceability paid by
consumers and the probability of a food safety hazard).
To assure that the necessary conditions implicitly deﬁne the optimal levels of
traceability that maximize the expected proﬁt function, the second-order condition
must be checked. This involves evaluation of the Hessian matrix for the proﬁt
maximization as shown below.
2

@2 3 =@g211
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..
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.
6 2
H¼6
@

=@g
3
11
6
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..
4
.
@2 3 =@g11 @g1n

   @2 3 =@g11 @g1i
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.
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   @2 3 =@g21i
..

.
   @2 3 =@g1i @g1n
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   @2 3 =@g11 @g1n
7
..
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.
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   @2 3 =@g1i @g1n 7
7
7
..
..
5
.
.
2
2
   @ 3 =@g1n

ð11Þ

Because the expected proﬁt function is concave, for the necessary conditions to
deﬁne a maximum, the Hessian must be negative semideﬁnite; it will be if
ð1Þn jHn j40. An alternative way to assess whether the ﬁrst-order conditions deﬁne
a maximum of the proﬁt function is to use the mathematical theorem relating the
shape of the function to its extreme points. This theorem says that if a function is
concave, then its extreme point is a maximum (Baldani, Bradﬁeld, & Turner, 1996).
Because the revenue from traceability is linear, the costs and the expected loss
functions are convex (by Assumptions 5 and 7, respectively), and the traceability
functions are linearly increasing, the proﬁt function is concave. Thus, the ﬁrst-order

conditions implicitly deﬁne the optimal level of traceability that each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm
must provide.
To examine whether traceability is feasible, we check border solutions looking at
the Kuhn–Tucker conditions:
@3
 0 and
@g11
..
..
.
.
@3
 0;
 0 and
@g1n

g11  0;

g1n

@3
g ¼0
@g11 11
..
.
@3
g ¼0
@g1n 1n

ð12Þ

Each of these conditions must hold simultaneously. There will be a border solution
for the provision of traceability from each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm if marginal proﬁts to the
third-tier ﬁrm decrease as traceability levels become positive. This occurs when the
ﬁrst Kuhn–Tucker condition binds and the second holds as a strict inequality. In this
case, there is no traceability because the third-tier ﬁrm will not adopt traceability and
no contracts are offered to ﬁrms in the ﬁrst and second tiers. If at least one ﬁrst-order
condition binds, a positive level of traceability is provided for a limited number of
ingredients and there will be partial adoption of traceability. Finally, if all the
necessary conditions bind, there will be full traceability with every ingredient used in
the production of the multi-ingredient product of the third-tier ﬁrm being traceable
and every ﬁrm in the ﬁrst and second tiers getting a contract to provide traceability.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
An important issue in the economics of traceability adoption is whether it is
desirable and efﬁcient to have full traceability. In the context of this study, full
traceability is deﬁned as having traceability from the ﬁrst-tier in the food chain for
every ingredient used by the third-tier ﬁrm producing the ﬁnal output. The previous
section discusses the conditions for no, partial, or full traceability in the general
case. Here we illustrate our general results using the case of a supply chain for a
product composed of three ingredients and focusing on the optimizing condition of
the third-tier ﬁrm (i.e., n 5 3, g2 5 g21, g22, g23 and g1 5 g11, g12, g13). This example is
further used to illustrate horizontal and vertical network effects on the optimal
level of information contracted for with ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms. In our context, network
effects are indirect and due to complementarities across levels of traceability
for each ingredient. The results of this case study can be generalized to
the n ingredient case above. However, the more ingredients are considered the
larger are the computational requirements. Once the constraints are substituted into
the model with three ingredients, the third-tier ﬁrm maximizes expected proﬁts now
deﬁned as
"
Max E½3  ¼p3 g3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞ 
G1

3
X
i¼1

c1i ðg1i Þ1

3
X

#
c2i ðg2i ðg1i ÞÞ

i¼1

 c3 ðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞÞ  cLðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞÞ
s:t:: G1  0

ð13Þ

The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the maximization of expected proﬁts for
the third-tier ﬁrm are
@E½3 
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
¼ 0 ) p3 3 g021  cL0 ðÞg021 3 ¼ c011 1c021 g021 1c03 ðÞg021 3
@g11
@g21
@g21
@g21
ð14Þ
@E½3 
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
¼ 0 ) p3 3 g022  cL0 ðÞg022 3 ¼ c012 1c022 g022 1c03 ðÞg022 3
@g12
@g22
@g22
@g22
ð15Þ
@E½3 
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
¼ 0 ) p3 3 g023  cL0 ðÞg023 3 ¼ c013 1c023 g023 1c03 ðÞg023 3
@g13
@g23
@g23
@g23
ð16Þ
Provided that the sufﬁcient condition for maximum expected proﬁts is met, solving
Equations (14)–(16) simultaneously yields the optimal choices of traceability for each
ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. These are a function of consumer willingness to pay for traceability (p3)
and the probability (c) of a food safety hazard. Once the optimal levels of traceability
provided by each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm are set, the remaining endogenous variables are
deﬁned using the constraints for the third-tier ﬁrm. Table 1 summarizes the
compensation and traceability levels that would be offered in the contracts between
the third-tier and each second-tier ﬁrm, and between them and the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms.
Along with the objective function Equation (13), Table 1 shows that the higher the
level of traceability for each ingredient, the higher the costs incurred by the third-tier
ﬁrm. This leads to the question of whether this ﬁrm will choose to have no, partial,
or full traceability.
Traceability is feasible if the third-tier ﬁrm offers a contract with the payment
scheme in Equation (7) to at least one of the ﬁrms in the second tier, which, in turn,
must offer a contract to the corresponding ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm. As every ingredient is
TABLE 1.

Traceability Levels and Premiums Along the Supply Chain
Firms

First-tier
contracts

11
12
13

Second-tier
contracts

21
22
23

Third-tier
contracts

3

Compensation
c11 ðg11 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
g11 ðp3 ; cÞ
c12 ðg12 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
¼
g12 ðp3 ; cÞ
c13 ðg13 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
¼
g13 ðp3 ; cÞ
c11 ðg11 ðÞÞ1c21 ðg21 ðg11 ðÞÞÞ
¼
g21 ðg11 ðÞÞ
c12 ðg12 ðÞÞ1c22 ðg22 ðg12 ðÞÞÞ
¼
g22 ðg12 ðÞÞ
c13 ðg13 ðÞÞ1c23 ðg23 ðg13 ðÞÞÞ
¼
g23 ðg13 ðÞÞ

p11 ¼
p12
p13
p21
p22
p23
p3

Traceability level
g11 ¼ g11 ðp3 ; cÞ
g12 ¼ g12 ðp3 ; cÞ
g13 ¼ g13 ðp3 ; cÞ
g21 ¼ g21 ðg11 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
g22 ¼ g22 ðg12 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
g23 ¼ g23 ðg13 ðp3 ; cÞÞ
g3 ¼ g3 ðg21 ðg11 ðÞÞ;
g22 ðg12 ðÞÞ; g23 ðg13 ðÞÞÞ

distinct with different production processes, they will have distinct traceability levels
and premiums. Furthermore, as risks differ from one ingredient to another, their
respective traceability levels will have different impacts on loss mitigation. Also, note
that though additional levels of upstream traceability have an indirect impact on
beneﬁts, they directly affect costs. The following propositions are presented for this
analysis. This discussion is based on the Kuhn–Tucker conditions.
g1i  0;

@E½3 
 0;
@g1i

and

@E½3 
g ¼ 0;
@g1i 1i

i ¼ 1; 2; 3

ð17Þ

Proposition 1: If the marginal costs of having traceability from every ﬁrm in the
ﬁrst-tier exceed the marginal beneﬁts to the third-tier ﬁrm, then traceability is not
implemented.
Traceability is not implemented if there are border solutions to each of the ﬁrstorder conditions Equations (14)–(16). From the Kuhn–Tucker conditions in
Equation (17), the third-tier ﬁrm has no incentive to adopt traceability if for each
ingredient the marginal expected proﬁts are decreasing as traceability becomes
positive. In other words, traceability is not feasible if the sum of the premium paid by
consumers and the marginal expected risk mitigation from having traceability does
not cover its aggregate marginal costs along the supply chain.
Verbeke (2005) suggests that consumers may face an overload of information and be
unable to understand the information provided by single-ingredient traceability
systems. Consumers may ﬁnd it even harder to use information provided by traceability
systems for multi-ingredient foods, which may hinder willingness to pay for traceability
in these products. It may also be harder to assess the food safety risks of each ingredient
used in a recipe for a multi-ingredient food, leading to uncertainties about how
traceability could mitigate those risks. These factors pose challenges for the voluntary
implementation of any traceability in supply chains for multi-ingredient foods.
Proposition 2: Partial traceability will occur if, for at least one ingredient, the
marginal beneﬁts to the third-tier ﬁrm equal the marginal costs incurred along the
food chain.
Suppose that for one of the three ingredients considered the marginal proﬁts from
traceability are zero. This occurs if for at least one of the ﬁrst-order conditions
Equations (14)–(16) there is a positive level of traceability or, in other words, there is
an interior solution for the choice of traceability for at least one ingredient.
There are a number of reasons to have only partial traceability in multi-ingredient food
supply chains. The third-tier ﬁrm may know from risk assessment reports that not all
ingredients used in the recipe are equally hazardous. Because the costs of implementing
traceability rise with the number of ingredients traced, ﬁrms may use these assessments to
decide to have traceability for a limited number of ingredients. Additionally, although
consumers may not be willing to pay for the costs of having traceability for all the
ingredients in a food product, they may be aware that certain ingredients are more
hazardous and be willing to pay a premium for having traceability for them.
Proposition 3: Full traceability will emerge if each of the three providers of
ingredients to the third-tier ﬁrm and each of the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms supplying them
accepts a contract for the provision of traceability downstream.
Full traceability requires the existence of an interior solution for each of the
necessary conditions Equations (14)–(16). In terms of the Kuhn–Tucker conditions
in Equation (17), this requires that for each ingredient the ﬁrst equation holds as a

strict inequality, whereas the remaining equations bind. In this case, and if the
second-order condition is met, each ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm receives a contract from the
corresponding second-tier ﬁrm to provide the level of traceability that maximizes the
third-tier ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts. Similarly, each second-tier ﬁrm receives a contract
from the third-tier ﬁrm setting a level of traceability and an appropriate premium.
In some cases, the production of ingredients may involve processes that mingle the
inputs to the ingredient in such a way that it becomes virtually impossible to maintain
a ﬂow of information. For example, milk from different producers may be mixed in a
tank before arriving at a cheese processor making the linkage between a cheese output
and the farm on which the milk originated less precise. In such cases, the level of
traceability may have an upper bound. However, unless there is traceability from the
farm it will be impossible to identify where an eventual food safety accident
originated. In such cases, mitigation of food safety hazards may be a strong driver for
full traceability and this may require new forms of organizing the supply chain.
Our traceability model enables the analysis of horizontal and vertical network
effects. Horizontal effects relate to how changes in levels of traceability for one
ingredient impact the levels of traceability of another ingredient. Vertical network
effects occur when a change in the contract between two ﬁrms in the chain impacts a
third ﬁrm contracting with only one of the initial ﬁrms. For example, there is a
vertical network effect in the supply chain when a decision taken by the third-tier
ﬁrm impacts the levels of traceability and premiums set in the contracts from secondtier to ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms. Vertical effects can be derived from changes in premiums paid
by consumers and/or in probabilities of food safety hazards.
To investigate the signs of horizontal and vertical effects, the objective function of
the third-tier ﬁrm is altered to include only one choice variable. The traceability
levels of the remaining ingredients become ﬁxed and can be treated as parameters.
Using this modiﬁcation it is possible to evaluate how the optimal level of traceability
speciﬁed in the contract offered to one of the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms changes with the level set
for another ﬁrm. This is a horizontal network effect. Similarly, this formulation
facilitates the interpretation of vertical network effects. Fixing the levels of
traceability for ingredients 2 and 3, the expected proﬁts of the third-tier ﬁrm become
"
Max 3 ¼ p3 g3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞ 
g11

3
X
i¼1

c1i ðg1i Þ1

3
X

#
c2i ðg2i ðg1i ÞÞ

i¼1

c3 ðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞÞcLðg3 ðg21 ðg11 Þ; g22 ðg12 Þ; g23 ðg13 ÞÞÞ
ð18Þ
s:t:: g11 ; g12 ; g13  0
The semicolon separates the traceability levels for the second and third ingredients,
which are now exogenous. The ﬁrst-order necessary condition for maximization of
expected proﬁts is
@3
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
@g ðÞ
¼0)p3 3 g021 cL0 ðÞg021 3 ¼c011 1c021 g021 1c03 ðÞg021 3
@g11
@g21
@g21
@g21

ð19Þ

This expression implicitly deﬁnes the optimal level of traceability for ingredient 1
from the ﬁrst-tier as a function of the traceability levels on ingredients 2 and 3,
the premium paid by consumers, and the probability of a food safety hazard,

i.e., g11 ¼ g11 ðg12 ; g13 ; p3 ; cÞ. The second-order condition for an optimum is
@2  3
¼  c0011 11  c0021 21ðg021 Þ2  c0021 g0021 1p3 g0021 g03 1p3 ðg021 Þ2 g03
g211
 cL0 g0021 g03 cL00 ðg021 g03 Þ2 cL0 ðg021 Þ2 g003 c03 g0021 g03 c003 ðg021 g03 Þ2 c03 ðg021 Þ2 g003
ð20Þ
Given Assumptions 3, 5, and 7 on the relation between traceability levels across
the supply chain and the proprieties of the cost and liability loss functions,
expression 19 can be simpliﬁed and signed as
@ 2 3
¼ c0011  c0021 ðg021 Þ2  cL00 ðg021 g03 Þ2  c003 ðg021 g03 Þ2 o0
g211

ð21Þ

Because the second-order condition for an optimum is veriﬁed by the implicit
function theorem, the necessary condition deﬁnes the optimal level of traceability
written in a contract with ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst tier. From this expression, we can do
comparative statics analysis. A horizontal network effect is a change in the level of
traceability speciﬁed in the contract of one of the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms, when the level of
traceability set for another ﬁrm changes. The result below presents the horizontal
network effect of the impact of a change in the traceability level for ﬁrm 2 in the ﬁrst
tier on the traceability level set for ﬁrm 1 in the same tier.

@g11 ðg12 ; g13 ; p3 ; cÞ ðp3  cL0  c0 Þð@2 g3 @g11 @g12 Þg021 g033  ðcL00 1c003 Þ@g3 =@g11 @g3 =@g12
¼
@g12
c0011  c0021 ðg021 Þ2  cL00 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2  c003 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2
ð22Þ
The denominator is the second-order condition and is therefore negative. In the
numerator, the term @2 g3 =@g11 @g12 is the cross-partial effect of changes in the
traceability level from ﬁrm 1 in the ﬁrst tier on the third-tier ﬁrm’s traceability level,
when the traceability levels set for the second ﬁrm in the ﬁrst tier also changes. By
Assumption 3 on the linearity of the traceability function, this cross-partial must be
zero; thus the sign of the numerator solely depends on the second term. Recall that,
by Assumptions 5 and 7, both the loss and cost functions are convex. Thus, the
numerator is also negative and the horizontal network effect is positive. If the level of
traceability in the contract for any ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm changes, then the levels of
traceability that other ﬁrst-tier ﬁrms must provide will change in the same direction.
This is an unanticipated result. It would be expected that depending on whether
traceability levels are substitutes, complements, or independent, horizontal network
effects would be, respectively, negative, positive, or zero. The result shows that
traceability levels across different ingredients are complementary. It suggests that in
multi-ingredient supply chains traceability levels will not increase for one ingredient
alone, which may indicate that the response to a requirement for more traceability
will be somewhat inelastic.
The vertical effects in the model result from a change in the premium and in the
probability of a food safety hazard. These are network effects because they indirectly
impact the level of traceability (and corresponding premium) offered to the ﬁrst-tier
ﬁrm producing ingredient 1, when the third-tier ﬁrm is affected by exogenous factors.

The vertical network effect of changes in the premium paid by consumers is
@g11 ðg12 ; g13 ; p3 ; cÞ
g021 @g3 =@g11
¼  00
@p3
c11  c0021 ðg021 Þ2  cL00 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2  c003 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2
ð23Þ
In this expression, the denominator is the second-order condition, which by
Equation (21) is negative. By Assumption 3 on the traceability functions, the
numerator is positive therefore the sign of the fraction is negative. However, the sign
of this result is the opposite of the sign of the fraction and thus is positive. This result
suggests that the higher the premium for traceability consumers are willing to pay,
the more traceability is required from upstream ﬁrms. Thus, this vertical network
effect is positive. The importance of this result is that to have additional levels of
traceability in a multi-ingredient supply chains it sufﬁces to motivate the leader of
the chain.
The impact of a change in the probability of a food safety hazard on the level of
traceability demanded from the ﬁrst-tier ﬁrm producing the ingredient is
@g11 ðg12 ; g13 ; p3 ; cÞ
L0 g021 @g3 =@g11
¼
2
00
00
0
@c
c11  c21 ðg21 Þ  cL00 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2  c003 ðg021 @g3 =@g11 Þ2
ð24Þ
As in Expression 23, the denominator is the second-order condition and has a
negative sign. To sign the numerator, recall that from Assumption 3 the traceability
functions are increasing in levels of traceability, whereas from Assumption 7 the loss
function is decreasing, thus the sign of the numerator is also negative. Because two
negatives become a positive, this vertical network effect is also positive. Thus, more
precise traceability information is expected from each ingredient as the probability of
a food safety hazard in a multi-ingredient product increases and to the extent that
traceability mitigates the ex-post consequences of these hazards.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
We present a formal network model to analyze interﬁrm voluntary traceability
systems for multi-ingredient foods. Its formulation draws on vertical control and
agency theories to analyze traceability adoption along a multi-ingredient food chain
as a coordination and institutional problem. The model is used to analyze
traceability adoption in a supply chain with three tiers producing a ﬁnal output
composed of n ingredients. The third-tier ﬁrm contracts for traceability from
upstream ﬁrms in response to consumer willingness to pay and/or the opportunity to
mitigate food safety losses. To implement traceability this ﬁrm must take into
account the costs incurred by each ﬁrm in the supply chain. The model also takes the
important steps of deﬁning traceability as a continuum of information rather than a
yes or no decision and recognizing possible heterogeneity in traceability needs across
the depth (tiers), breadth (number of ingredients), and precision of information
required in multi-ingredient supply chains.
Full traceability is deﬁned as the existence of a vertical and downstream ﬂow of
information from every ﬁrm in the ﬁrst tier, through second-tier ﬁrms to a third-tier
ﬁrm selling a multi-ingredient product to consumers. Full traceability is feasible if

the marginal beneﬁts of having traceability for each ingredient outweigh the
marginal costs incurred by each ﬁrm in the food chain. Partial traceability adoption,
in which the third-tier ﬁrm only contracts for traceability on a limited number of
ingredients, may result in considerable savings and responds to the fact that some of
the ingredients composing a multi-ingredient food may have very limited
probabilities of food safety hazards or enter into the ﬁnal product in small
proportions, resulting in lower beneﬁts than costs from traceability.
Our model is suited to investigate both horizontal and vertical network effects. The
analysis suggests that the horizontal network effects of traceability are always positive,
implying that traceability levels are complements across the ingredients composing the
output of the third-tier ﬁrm. Vertical network effects result from changes in
traceability premiums paid by consumers to the third-tier ﬁrm and in the probabilities
of food safety hazards. Vertical effects are positive if consumers’ willingness to pay for
traceability increases or the probabilities of food safety hazards increase.
A possible extension of our work would consider different representations of multiingredient supply chains. Simulations may provide additional insights into how
incentives for partial and full traceability impact its adoption and the extent of network
effects. Another approach to future research is to explore the parameterization of the
probabilities of food safety hazards for each ingredient to analyze criteria for the
decision of which ingredients to trace in the case of partial traceability adoption.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper is part of Diogo Souza-Monteiro’s Ph.D. thesis at the University of
Massachusetts-Amherst. This research was supported by a doctoral fellowship from
the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) and by a USDA
Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service (CSREES) Special
Grant to the Food Marketing Policy Center, University of Connecticut and by
subcontract at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. The authors would like to
thank very helpful comments from two reviewers, the participants at the 7th
International Conference in International Chains and Networks, and a seminar at
the University of Reading (UK) where earlier versions of this paper were presented.
Reamining errors are the author’ sole responsibility.

REFERENCES
Baldani, J., Bradﬁeld, J., & Turner, R. (1996). Mathematical economics. Fort Worth, TX: The
Dryden Press/Harcourt Brace College.
Banterle, A., & Stranieri, S. (2008). Information, labelling, and vertical coordination: An
analysis of the Italian meat supply networks. Agribusiness, 24, 320–331.
Dickinson, D.L., & Bailey, D. (2002). Meat traceability: Are U.S. consumers willing to pay for
it? Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 27, 348–364.
Dupuy, C., Botta-Genoulaz, V., & Guinet, A. (2005). Batch dispersion model to optimise
traceability in food industry. Journal of Food Engineering, 70, 333–339.
European Parliament and Council. (2002). Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, Laying Down the
General Principles and Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food
Safety Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety. Ofﬁcial Journal
of the European Communities, L31, 1–24.

Folbert, J.P., & Dagevos, J.C. (2000). Veilig en vertrouwd–voedselveiligheid en het verwerven
van consumentenvertrouwen in comparative context [Safe and trusted: Food safety and the
gaining of consumer faith in comparative context]. Den Haag, The Netherlands: LEI.
Golan, E., Krissoff, B., Kuchler, F., Nelson, K., Price, G., & Calvin, L. (2004). Traceability in
the U.S. food supply: Economic theory and industry studies (Agricultural Economic
Report No. 830). Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service.
Goldsmith, P.D., & Bender, K. (2004). Ten conversations about identity preservation. Journal
of Chain and Network Science, 4, 111–123.
Gracia, A., & Zeballos, G. (2005). Attitudes of retailers towards the EU traceability and
labeling system for beef. Journal of Food Distribution Research, 36(3), 45–56.
Hobbs, J.E. (2004). Information asymmetry and the role of traceability systems. Agribusiness,
20, 397–415.
Hobbs, J.E., Bailey, D., Dickinson, D.L., & Haghiri, M. (2005). Traceability in the Canadian red
meat sector: Do consumers care? Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 53, 47–65.
Hofstede, G.J. (2002). Transparency in netchains. In E. van Amerongen, C. van der Harg,
R. Kruse, & S. Peggexx (Eds.), The challenge of global chains (pp. 73–89). Wageningen,
Netherlands: Wageningen Academic Publishers.
Jansen-Veullers, M.H., van Dorp, C.A., & Beulens, A. (2003). Managing traceability
information in manufacture. International Journal of Information Management, 23,
395–413.
Meuwissen, M.P.M., Velthuis, A.G.J., Hogeveen, H., & Huirne, R.B.M. (2003). Traceability
and certiﬁcation in meat supply chains. Journal of Agribusiness, 21, 167–181.
Moe, T. (1998). Perspectives on traceability in food manufacture. Food and Science
Technology, 9, 211–214.
Pouliot, S., & Sumner, D.A. (2008). Traceability, liability, and incentives for food safety and
quality. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91, 15–27.
Resende-Filho, M.A., & Buhr, B.L. (2008). A principal-agent model for evaluating the
economic value of a traceability system: A case study with injection-site lesion control in fed
cattle. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 91, 1091–1102.
Royer, J.S. (1998). Market structure, vertical integration, and contract coordination. In
J.S. Royer & R.T. Rogers (Eds.), The industrialization of agriculture: Vertical coordination
in the U.S. food system (pp. 73–98). Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing.
Sporleder, T.L., & Moss, L.E. (2002). Knowledge management in the global food system:
Network embeddedness and social capital. American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
84, 1345–1352.
Starbird, S.A., & Amanor-Boadu, V. (2004). Traceability, inspection, and food safety. Paper
presented at the American Agricultural Economics Association Annual Meeting, Denver, CO.
Starbird, S.A., & Amanor-Boadu, V. (2007). Contract selectivity, food safety, and traceability.
Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, 5, Article 2.
Trienekens, J.H., & Beulens, A.J.M. (2001). The implications of EU food safety legislation
and consumer demands on supply chain information systems. Paper presented at the
International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, Proceedings of the 11th
Annual World Food and Agribusiness Forum, Sydney, Australia (June, 2001).
Velthuis, A.G.J., Mourits, M.C.M., & Hogeveen, H. (2008). Costs, beneﬁts and reliability of
livestock tracing systems in the Netherlands. Paper presented at the Organized Session on
the Economics of Traceability, XII Congress of the European Association of Agricultural
Economics (EAAE), Gent, Belgium (August, 2008).
Verbeke, W. (2005). Agriculture and the food industry in the Information Age. European
Review of Agricultural Economics, 32, 247–368.
Vernede, R., Verdenius, F., & Broeze, J. (2003). Traceability in food processing chains: State
of the art and future developments (Rapport 015). Wageningen, The Netherlands:
Wageningen University, Agrotechnology and Food Sciences Group.

Diogo Souza-Monteiro is a Lecturer in Marketing at the Kent Business School, University of
Kent (UK). He received his Ph.D. from the University of Massachusetts-Amherst. His research
focuses on the economics and marketing of food quality and safety, with particular interest in the
economics of traceability, food standards, and certiﬁcation.
Julie Caswell is a Professor and Chair of the Department of Resource Economics at the
University of Massachusetts-Amherst. She received her Ph.D. from the University of WisconsinMadison. Her research focuses on understanding the operation of domestic and international food
systems, with particular interest in the economics of food quality and labeling, especially for
safety and nutrition, and international trade.

